Evil? No Problem

In sections X and XI, Philo and Demea catalogue human misery and Philo uses this evidence to prove that either God does NOT exist or He is NOT benevolent. Is this argument sound? If not, where does the argument fail? What about the possibility that suffering is part of some great good like free will or character development (a theodicy)?

No Brute Facts -- the Principle of Sufficient Reason

You are hiking in a remote wilderness, miles from the nearest building or even cell phone tower. You come upon a clearing and see a crystal sphere hovering over you and emitting colorful light pulses in some seeming order: red, blue, green and the pattern repeats. Should there be an explanation for this odd phenomenon or is it acceptable to shrug our shoulders and mutter "Stuff happens"? Can we extrapolate from this case to a general principle of the universe? If so, can we prove that God (or a reasonable facsimile) exists?

The Relevance of the Origin of Species

One important scientific development unavailable to David Hume or any of his fictional interlocutors is the theory of evolution. For many people today, both theists and atheists, religious believers, scientists and intellectuals, the truth of evolution is bound up with the truth of theism. So what is the significance of evolution for the design argument? Does is it provide evidence for either side of the debate? On this 154th anniversary of the publication of Darwin's seminal Origin of Species, it is fitting to ask: where might a discussion of Darwin have fit into Hume's Dialogues?

God -- Or Some Lesser Designer

In Chapter V, Philo devises several arguments that accept that the universe has a designer, but deny that that designer is God. Given our traditional definition that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, is Philo correct? Or is there a response to his arguments? Does it matter if the designer is the traditional God?

Evidence and Theism

In response to Demea and Philo's attack on reason in Part I, Cleanthes proposes a principle that he thinks should be applied to any belief, including belief in God's existence.  He proposes that believers "proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs" (9).  In other words, we are justified in believing something if and only if we have evidence  -- and the degree of our belief should be calibrated to the strength of the evidence.  Is that true in every case?  What about regarding our belief in God?  Pascal, for example, proposed in his famous wager argument that, assuming there is no strong evidence either way,  it is in our best interest to believe in God.  Given the importance of accepting or rejecting theism for one's life values, is it ever permissible to believe (or disbelieve) in God on flimsy evidence?

MacBeth's Dagger and Other Illusions

Hylas objects to Philonous' idealism by claiming that on his view there is no way to distinguish between veridical appearances and illusions. In other words, idealism implies that the danger than Macbeth sees before his eyes but cannot clutch is just as real as the dagger he uses to kill Duncan. Is this a valid objection? How successful is Philonous' response?

What You See Is What You Get?

Berkeley argues that skepticism is only possible if there is a distinction between appearance and reality.  Furthermore, he claims that that distinction collapses once we deny the existence of material substance.  Given these two premises, he concludes that skepticism in false.  But is he correct?  Does the distinction between appearance and reality collapse if idealism is true?  Is it possible for God to perceive an object differently than me?  Does that possibility redrawn the line between appearance and reality? Are there other problems with this argument?